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jesse fried
jesse fried
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School
Verified email at law.harvard.edu
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Executive compensation as an agency problem
LA Bebchuk, JM Fried
Journal of economic perspectives 17 (3), 71-92, 2003
38522003
Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive compensation
L Bebchuk, JM Fried
Harvard University Press, 2006
32672006
Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation
LA Bebchuk, J Fried, D Walker
National bureau of economic research, 2002
29582002
Pay without performance: Overview of the issues
LA Bebchuk, JM Fried
US Corporate Governance, 113-143, 2009
11622009
The uneasy case for the priority of secured claims in bankruptcy
LA Bebchuk, JM Fried
Yale Lj 105, 857, 1995
7341995
Pay without performance
L Bebchuk, J Fried
Harvard University Press, 2004
4842004
Paying for long-term performance
LA Bebchuk, JM Fried
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1915-1959, 2010
4342010
Agency costs of venture capitalist control in startups
JM Fried, M Ganor
NYUL rev. 81, 967, 2006
2842006
Reducing the profitability of corporate insider trading through pretrading disclosure
JM Fried
S. Cal. L. Rev. 71, 303, 1997
2171997
Stealth compensation via retirement benefits
LA Bebchuk, J Fried
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004
1622004
Informed trading and false signaling with open market repurchases
JM Fried
Calif. L. Rev. 93, 1323, 2005
1522005
Insider signaling and insider trading with repurchase tender offers
JM Fried
The University of Chicago Law Review, 421-477, 2000
1502000
The uneasy case for favoring long-term shareholders
JM Fried
Yale LJ 124, 1554, 2014
1492014
Excess-pay clawbacks
J Fried
J. Corp. l. 36, 721, 2010
1322010
Executive compensation in America: optimal contracting or extraction of rents?
LA Bebchuk, J Fried, D Walker
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001
1322001
The uneasy case for the priority of secured claims in bankruptcy: further thoughts and a reply to critics
LA Bebchuk, J Fried
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998
1241998
Rationalizing criminal forfeiture
DJ Fried
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 79, 328, 1988
1241988
Executive compensation at Fannie Mae: A case study of perverse incentives, nonperformance pay, and camouflage
LA Bebchuk, JM Fried
J. Corp. L. 30, 807, 2004
1182004
Open market repurchases: signaling or managerial opportunism?
JM Fried
Theoretical inquiries in Law 2 (2), 2001
1172001
Renegotiation of cash flow rights in the sale of VC-backed firms
B Broughman, J Fried
Journal of Financial Economics 95 (3), 384-399, 2010
962010
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Articles 1–20