Reliabilist epistemology A Goldman, B Beddor | 182 | 2021 |
Modal Virtue Epistemology B Beddor, C Pavese Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2018 | 83 | 2018 |
Process reliabilism's troubles with defeat B Beddor The Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259), 145-159, 2015 | 66 | 2015 |
New Work for Certainty B Beddor Philosophers' Imprint 20 (8), 1-25, 2020 | 57* | 2020 |
Might do better: Flexible relativism and the QUD B Beddor, A Egan Semantics and Pragmatics 11, 7: EA-7: EA, 2018 | 42 | 2018 |
Believing epistemic contradictions B Beddor, S Goldstein The review of symbolic logic 11 (1), 87-114, 2018 | 34 | 2018 |
Practical knowledge without luminosity B Beddor, C Pavese Mind 131 (523), 919-936, 2022 | 32 | 2022 |
Evidentialism, circularity, and grounding B Beddor Philosophical Studies 172, 1847-1868, 2015 | 31* | 2015 |
Subjective disagreement B Beddor Noûs 53 (4), 819-851, 2019 | 27 | 2019 |
Skills as Knowledge C Pavese, B Beddor Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2022 | 24* | 2022 |
Certainty in action B Beddor The Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281), 711-737, 2020 | 23 | 2020 |
Justification as faultlessness B Beddor Philosophical Studies 174 (4), 901-926, 2017 | 20 | 2017 |
Fallibility for expressivists B Beddor Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4), 763-777, 2020 | 17 | 2020 |
Reduction in epistemology B Beddor Rutgers The State University of New Jersey, School of Graduate Studies, 2016 | 15 | 2016 |
Reasons for Reliabilism B Beddor Reasons, Justification, and Defeat, 0 | 15 | |
mighty knowledge B Beddor, S Goldstein Journal of Philosophy 118 (5), 229-269, 2021 | 13 | 2021 |
Relativism and Expressivism B Beddor Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, 528-540, 2019 | 13 | 2019 |
A solution to the many attitudes problem B Beddor Philosophical Studies 177 (9), 2789-2813, 2020 | 8 | 2020 |
Noncognitivism and Epistemic Evaluations B Beddor Philosophers' Imprint 19 (10), 1-27, 2019 | 8 | 2019 |
The Toxin and the Dogmatist B Beddor Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4), 727-740, 2019 | 8 | 2019 |