Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen
Professor of Philosophy, Aarhus University
Verified email at hum.au.dk - Homepage
TitleCited byYear
No norm needed: On the aim of belief
A Steglich‐Petersen
The Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225), 499-516, 2006
1342006
Weighing the aim of belief
A Steglich-Petersen
Philosophical studies 145 (3), 395-405, 2009
832009
How to be a teleologist about epistemic reasons
A Steglich-Petersen
Reasons for Belief, 2011
572011
Reasons for belief
Cambridge University Press, 2011
34*2011
Does doxastic transparency support evidentialism?
A Steglich‐Petersen
Dialectica 62 (4), 541-547, 2008
302008
Truth as the aim of epistemic justification
A Steglich-Petersen
272013
Luck as an epistemic notion
A Steglich-Petersen
Synthese 176 (3), 361-377, 2010
262010
Against essential normativity of the mental
A Steglich-Petersen
Philosophical Studies 140 (2), 263-283, 2008
252008
The truth norm and guidance: A reply to Glüer and Wikforss
A Steglich-Petersen
Mind, 2010
232010
Against the contrastive account of singular causation
A Steglich-Petersen
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (1), 115-143, 2011
172011
Voluntarism and transparent deliberation
A Steglich-Petersen
South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (2), 171-176, 2006
152006
The no guidance argument
A Steglich‐Petersen
Theoria 79 (3), 279-283, 2013
142013
Why desire reasoning is developmentally prior to belief reasoning
A Steglich‐Petersen, J Michael
Mind & Language 30 (5), 526-549, 2015
112015
Transparency, doxastic norms, and the aim of belief
A Steglich-Petersen
Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía, 59-74, 2013
112013
A higher-order approach to disagreement
MS Rasmussen, A Steglich-Petersen, JC Bjerring
Episteme 15 (1), 80-100, 2018
82018
Epistemic Instrumentalism, Permissibility, and Reasons
A Steglich-Petersen
Normativity: Epistemic and practical, 260, 2018
82018
Against essential mental normativity again
A Steglich-Petersen
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie 50 …, 2011
82011
Fictional Persuasion and the Nature of Belief
A Steglich-Petersen
Art and Belief, 174, 2017
62017
Knowing the answer to a loaded question
A Steglich‐Petersen
Theoria 81 (2), 97-125, 2015
62015
Philosophical thought experiments as heuristics for theory discovery
SK Praëm, A Steglich-Petersen
Synthese 192 (9), 2827-2842, 2015
52015
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