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Yunan Li
Titel
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År
Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
Y Li
Journal of Economic Theory, 105000, 2020
502020
Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values
Y Li
Games and Economic Behavior 103, 225-253, 2017
332017
Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
Y Li
Theoretical Economics 16 (3), 1139-1194, 2021
15*2021
Efficient Mechanisms with Information Acquisition
Y Li
Journal of Economics Theory 182, 279-328, 2019
102019
Security-bid auctions with information acquisition
Y Li, Z Huang
Available at SSRN 3850243, 2023
42023
Endogenous Labor Market Cycles
Y Li, C Wang
International Economic Review 63 (2), 849-881, 2022
2*2022
An efficient ascending auction
Y Li
12013
Collective Decision Through an Informed Designer
Y Li, X Zhang
Available at SSRN 3761473, 2022
2022
Essays in Mechanism Design
Y Li
University of Pennsylvania, 2017
2017
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Artikler 1–9