| A comparative evaluation of heuristic line balancing techniques FB Talbot, JH Patterson, WV Gehrlein Management science 32 (4), 430-454, 1986 | 408 | 1986 |
| Condorcet's paradox WV Gehrlein Theory and decision 15 (2), 161-197, 1983 | 221 | 1983 |
| Condorcet’s Paradox WV Gehrlein Condorcet’s Paradox, 2006 | 215 | 2006 |
| Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles WV Gehrlein, PC Fishburn Public Choice, 1-18, 1976 | 212 | 1976 |
| Voting paradoxes and group coherence: the Condorcet efficiency of voting rules WV Gehrlein, D Lepelley Springer Science & Business Media, 2010 | 203 | 2010 |
| The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution WV Gehrlein, PC Fishburn Journal of Economic Theory 13 (1), 14-25, 1976 | 187 | 1976 |
| Borda's rule, positional voting, and Condorcet's simple majority principle PC Fishburn, WV Gehrlein Public Choice, 79-88, 1976 | 161 | 1976 |
| Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences* WV Gehrlein Theory and decision 52 (2), 171-199, 2002 | 125 | 2002 |
| General mathematical programming formulations for the statistical classification problem WV Gehrlein Operations Research Letters 5 (6), 299-304, 1986 | 116 | 1986 |
| Condorcet's paradox and the Condorcet efficiency of voting rules WV Gehrlein Mathematica Japonica 45, 173-199, 1997 | 104 | 1997 |
| The Condorcet criterion and committee selection WV Gehrlein Mathematical Social Sciences 10 (3), 199-209, 1985 | 100 | 1985 |
| Coincidence probabilities for simple majority and positional voting rules WV Gehrlein, PC Fishburn Social Science Research 7 (3), 272-283, 1978 | 83 | 1978 |
| Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes WV Gehrlein, D Lepelley Springer, 2017 | 82 | 2017 |
| An analysis of simple two‐stage voting systems PC Fishburn, WV Gehrlein Behavioral Science 21 (1), 1-12, 1976 | 80 | 1976 |
| Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates WV Gehrlein, PC Fishburn Journal of Economic Theory 19 (1), 38-49, 1978 | 73 | 1978 |
| Which scoring rule maximizes Condorcet efficiency under IAC? DP Cervone, WV Gehrlein, WS Zwicker Theory and Decision 58, 145-185, 2005 | 71 | 2005 |
| Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules WV Gehrlein mathematical social sciences 2 (2), 123-130, 1982 | 65 | 1982 |
| An analysis of voting procedures with nonranked voting PC Fishburn, WV Gehrlein Behavioral Science 22 (3), 178-185, 1977 | 62 | 1977 |
| Towards a theory of elections with probabilistic preferences PC Fishburn, WV Gehrlein Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1907-1924, 1977 | 61 | 1977 |
| Majority efficiencies for simple voting procedures: summary and interpretation PC Fishburn, WV Gehrlein Theory and Decision 14 (2), 141-153, 1982 | 60 | 1982 |
Dominique Lepelleyprofesseur (émérite) de sciences économiques, CEMOI, université de La RéunionVerificeret mail på univ-reunion.fr
