Xiang Chen
Xiang Chen
California Lutheran University
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The cognitive structure of scientific revolutions
H Andersen, P Barker, X Chen
Cambridge University Press, 2006
Thomas Kuhn‘s latest notion of incommensurability
X Chen
Journal for general philosophy of science 28 (2), 257-273, 1997
Kuhn's mature philosophy of science and cognitive psychology
H Andersen, P Barker, X Chen
Philosophical Psychology 9 (3), 347-363, 1996
Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions and cognitive psychology
X Chen, H Andersen, P Barker
Philosophical psychology 11 (1), 5-28, 1998
Kuhn on concepts and categorization
P Barker, X Chen, H Andersen
Thomas Kuhn, 212-245, 2003
Why do people misunderstand climate change? Heuristics, mental models and ontological assumptions
X Chen
Climatic Change 108 (1), 31-46, 2011
Continuity through revolutions: A frame-based account of conceptual change during scientific revolutions
X Chen, P Barker
Philosophy of Science 67, S208-S223, 2000
Object and event concepts: A cognitive mechanism of incommensurability
X Chen
Philosophy of science 70 (5), 962-974, 2003
Why did John Herschel fail to understand polarization? The differences between object and event concepts
X Chen
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (3), 491-513, 2003
Instrumental traditions and theories of light: The uses of instruments in the optical revolution
X Chen
Springer Science & Business Media, 2013
The object bias and the study of scientific revolutions: Lessons from developmental psychology
X Chen
Philosophical Psychology 20 (4), 479-503, 2007
Taxonomic changes and the particle-wave debate in early nineteenth-century Britain
X Chen
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 26 (2), 251-271, 1995
Local incommensurability and communicability
X Chen
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science …, 1990
Transforming temporal knowledge: Conceptual change between event concepts
X Chen
Perspectives on Science 13 (1), 49-73, 2005
A different kind of revolutionary change: transformation from object to process concepts
X Chen
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (2), 182-191, 2010
The ‘platforms’ for comparing incommensurable taxonomies: A cognitive-historical analysis
X Chen
Journal for general philosophy of science 33 (1), 1-22, 2002
Cognitive appraisal and power: David Brewster, Henry Brougham, and the tactics of the emission—Undulatory controversy during the early 1850s
X Chen, P Barker
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 23 (1), 75-101, 1992
Visual Photometry in the Early 19th Century: A “Good” Science with “Wrong” Measurements
X Chen
Wrong for the right reasons, 161-183, 2005
Why do scientists have disagreements about experiment?: incommensurability in the use of goal-derived categories
X Chen
Scripts and conceptual change
X Chen
In Science, Cognitive, and Consciousness, Nanchang, 96-117, 2004
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